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Resumo
Perspetivas Estratégicas sobre a Disputa Sino-
Japonesa em Torno das Ilhas Diaoyu/Senkaku
Nos últimos anos, mas particularmente nos últi‑
mos meses, testemunhamos uma crescente atenção 
mediática e académica dedicada à disputa entre 
o Japão e a República Popular da China no Mar 
da China Oriental. O grupo de ilhas e rochedos 
conhecido como Senkaku no Japão, e Diaoyu na 
China, tem assumido papel de relevo nos debates 
sobre a evolução do ambiente securitário na rela‑
ção bilateral, assim como na região Ásia‑Pacífico.
Analisando a disputa, é de realçar não só as rápi‑
das transformações a ocorrer tal ambiente securi‑
tário, mas também o potencial para erros afetarem 
o comportamento estratégico dos países da região. 
Existe, pois, um perigo real de se desenrolar um 
confronto militar, mesmo que limitado.
Consequentemente, este trabalho analisa as ca‑
racterísticas preponderantes do comportamento 
estratégico do Japão, no contexto da disputa ao 
tomar em consideração as várias dimensões da 
análise estratégica, as suas interligações, e as impli‑
cações geopolíticas e geoestratégicas resultantes.
Abstract
In recent years, but particularly in the last few months, 
we have seen growing media and scholarly attention fo-
cusing on the dispute between Japan and the People´s 
Republic of China in the East China Sea. The group of 
islands and rocks known as Senkaku in Japan, and Di-
aoyu in China, has taken centre-stage in debates on the 
evolution of the security environment in bilateral rela-
tions, as well as in the Asia-Pacific region writ large.
Looking at this dispute, one is struck not only by the 
rapid changes occurring in the said security environ-
ment, but also by potential mishaps besieging the stra-
tegic behaviour of all neighbouring states. There exists 
a real danger of a military conflict, however limited, 
occurring.
Consequently, this paper analyses the determinant fea-
tures of Japan´s strategic behaviour within the context 
of the dispute by taking into consideration the several 
dimensions of strategy, how they interconnect, and the 
resulting geostrategic and geopolitical implications.
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In recent years, but particularly in the last few months, we have seen growing me‑
dia and scholarly attention focusing on the dispute between Japan and the People´s 
Republic of China (PRC/China) in the East China Sea. The group of islands and 
rocks known as Senkaku in Japan, and Diaoyu in China (Hagström, 2012: n1), has 
taken centre‑stage in debates on the evolution of the security environment in bilat‑
eral relations, as well as in the Asia‑Pacific region writ large.
Looking at this dispute, one is struck not only by the rapid changes occurring in 
the said security environment, but also by potential mishaps besieging the strate‑
gic behaviour of all neighbouring states.
Unsurprisingly, the impact any major disruption to regional security stemming 
from clashes in or around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is a matter of 
extreme importance. That a dispute over the said islands can provoke a grave 
deterioration of what has essentially been a peaceful, albeit often unstable, secu‑
rity environment is not merely the main proposition of this paper. It also serves 
as testimony of the relatively insufficient knowledge we have of the strategic im‑
plications of the dispute. Moreover, it also attests to the possibility of a military 
escalation between Japan and China. Concordantly, analyses on matters pertain‑
ing to the threat or use of military force in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute 
are forthcoming.
Since the dispute first came to the fore, in the late 1960s, there have been regu‑
lar encounters between both countries´ military and constabulary forces, but also 
among civilians, at sea and in the skies above. The rate of these encounters, as we 
will see later, has increased exponentially over the last years to become a nearly 
daily occurrence. Incidentally, some of these encounters have seldom resulted in 
more extensive flare‑ups, which have in turn led to not unimportant crises in bi‑
lateral relations.
For Japan, this is a time of heightened tensions and grave anxiety regarding the 
future of the dispute. Consequently, it is important to look at the strategic predica‑
ment which underpins and pervades this country´s actions and perceptions, with 
particular emphasis on issues concerning the threat or use of military force in the 
pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. In other words, this paper hopes to contri‑
bute to Japan´s strategic debate on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and assist 
its analysis in Portugal.
There are two important caveats worth mentioning beforehand. First, the au‑
thor does not subscribe to the view that an open, direct and calculated military 
conflict is likely or indeed inevitable, considering the larger ebb and flow of 
geopolitical and geostrategic dynamics in East Asia. Second, the Republic of 
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China (Taiwan) is also a claimant to the islands (which it calls Diaoyutai) and 
an important actor in the regional strategic balance. However, as neither China 
nor Japan recognise it a sovereign state, it is deliberately omitted from our 
analysis (Sun, 2012: 146‑9).
With that in mind, the paper will proceed to address the following question: what 
are the determinant features of Japan´s strategic behaviour within the context of 
the dispute? Inherent to this task, we are also interested in exploring what is the 
bearing of the several dimensions of strategy in that behaviour, how they interco‑
nnect, and lastly, what are their geostrategic and geopolitical implications.
We will answer these questions with the objective of: providing a brief overview 
of what is at stake, particularly for Japan; identifying the strategic implications 
for the country; and analysing the transformations in its strategic predicament. 
To support us in our study, it is vital to make extensive use of official policy docu‑
ments, quantitative resources, as well as specialised literature in the field of stra‑
tegic studies and foreign policy to provide us with the theoretical tools nece‑ssary 
for explaining the dispute from a strategic lens.
This paper will be divided into four parts. Firstly, we will make some introductory 
comments on the strategic relevance of this dispute for both Japan and China. This 
will be accomplished by highlighting several dimensions, by way of a contextu‑
alisation. Secondly, we will analyse the nature of Japan´s presence in the waters 
and skies surrounding the disputed islands, in its military‑strategic dimension. 
Subsequently, we will refer to the dispute´s geographic referents as key elements in 
Japan´s ability to think and act strategically. Fourthly, we will finish by presenting 
some grand‑strategic options for the years ahead.
The Dispute in Strategic Perspective
The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute can be approached from several analytical 
dimensions, which help us consider it in proper context. In fact, combinations 
of these dimensions can be found in the overwhelming majority of studies on 
the issue, although a robust body of knowledge on its strategic contours is still 
lacking. Colin Gray (2009: 4‑6) identified seven such dimensions. We will tackle 
them in turn.
Historically, the dispute began in the late 1960s with the discovery of oil and 
natural gas reserves by a geological survey of the United Nations´ Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East. Countries in the region immediately took 
notice, including China, Taiwan and Japan. At the time, the Ryukyu Islands were 
under the control of the United States, along with the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 
but as control reverted to Japanese hands in 1971, sovereignty was questioned 
by its neighbours. The implications of this legal structure between Japanese and 
American authorities, however, is severely criticised by Chinese and Taiwanese 
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officials (Ming, 2012; Hara, 2011). Indeed, there is little agreement as to the true 
significance and implications of any of the legal documents invoked by the con‑
cerned parties.
Following the Sino‑Japanese normalisation talks of 1972 and peace negotiations of 
1978, anxieties concerning the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands would 
be soothed through carefully coordinated diplomacy. As Michael Green (2001: 85) 
points out: “During his visit to Japan in 1978, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping an‑
nounced that the territorial issue should be put off for the future so that Tokyo 
and Beijing could focus on jointly developing the islands’ resources based on the 
spirit of the new Japan‑China Friendship Treaty. This formula for depoliticizing 
the Senkaku issue held for over a decade.”
Despite the best intentions, real events cast a shadow over diplomacy. As Nakani‑
shi (2011: 130) recalls, “opposition to a peace treaty grew when, in April 1978, 100 
mainland Chinese fishing vessels gathered off the Senkaku Islands in a show of 
sovereignty.” Japanese leaders stood in waiting and clashes were avoided at sea. 
The political compromise thus decided to set history and sovereignty of the islands 
aside by favouring economics (Hasegawa and Kazuhiko, 2008: 44‑7; Nakanishi, 
2011; Green, 2001: 77‑109).
Fast forwarding in time, the dispute suffered its most dramatic turn in Septem‑
ber 2012, when the Japanese government´s decided to nationalise three of the is‑
lands. This decision followed former‑Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro´s attempt 
to purchase the islands from its private owner by the metropolitan government, 
resorting to public donations, a decision backed by many of the right‑wing politi‑
cians. To retain control over domestic activities and avoid angering China with 
unwarranted domestic politicking, former Prime‑Minister Noda Yoshihiko´s go‑
vernment decided to intervene in order to avoid further escalation. Needless to 
say, this provoked an immediate row with China, and tensions have spiked since.
Economically though, the islands have little to no value in themselves. With less 
than 7km2, they cannot provide the conditions for long‑term human settlement. 
Why then risk deterioration of bilateral relations at a time of accelerated economic 
interdependence? After all, the United Nations survey´s findings of mineral re‑
sources under the seabed, although certainly creating some expectations on both 
sides, were not definitive.
For these expectations to materialise into interests, we would have to look at 
the dispositions contained in the United States Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS). Parts V and VI of the treaty, signed in 1982, regulated ma‑tters 
pertaining to Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and Continental Shelves of sig‑
natory states. Their impact to the dispute could not have been greater. They 
opened the possibility of states claiming privileged economic rights not just 
over the fish stocks within the EZZ, but more importantly perhaps, of mineral 
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and energy resources located in the seabed and subsoil until a total distance of 
350nm from the baseline. Suddenly, the calculated reserves on the East China 
Sea could be tapped by resource‑hungry countries like Japan and China, and 
competition ensued.
Nonetheless, Manning (2013) believes Chinese calculations of existing reserves are 
overly inflated, both in the East and South China Sea, where it also has several 
ongoing disputes with neighbouring countries. The same author says: “Chinese 
estimates of oil and gas reserves in both disputed areas appear exaggerated com‑
pared with those of major multinational energy firms and other analysts. China 
estimates East China Sea reserves at 160 billion barrels of oil nearly double that 
of US Energy Information Agency estimates”. To circumvent legal definitions and 
exploit the resources, the Chinese have attempted to negotiate joint‑development 
of gas and oil resources, although Japan has always refused for believing it would 
weaken its sovereign integrity.
Socially and culturally, that is to say, on issues regarding societal values, norms 
and identity in both countries, this dispute is also provoking noteworthy dyna‑
mics. This happens because of the impact it has at the level of public and elite 
perceptions, where nationalism and mistrust are undisputedly rising amidst 
growing uncertainty. That is the opinion of Joseph Nye (2012), who recently de‑
nounced Japan´s nationalist turn. “While Chinese rhetoric is overheated, there 
is certainly a rightward shift in mood in Japan,” although as the former US 
Assistant Secretary of Defence acknowledges, “it would be difficult to describe 
it as militaristic.”
Moving on to another dimension, technology could not play a greater role, es‑
pecially on China´s side. Returning to Manning, without recent developments in 
deep‑sea drilling technology, the economic prospects of the area surrounding the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands would not have appeared as tempting. This technology 
is especially relevant in oil and gas fields east of the islands, where depths can 
easily surpass 1500m in the Okinawa Through. Furthermore, Chinese technologi‑
cal advancements are also evident in its military and constabulary forces. These 
forces, particularly the Maritime Surveillance Force (MSF), among a host of other 
organisations with maritime jurisdiction, collectively known as the Five Dragons 
(Goldstein, 2010), now enable China to project its presence to the islands more 
assertively and for longer periods of time, whereas before Japan´s presence and 
control went virtually unchallenged.
Because this paper will deal with the three remaining dimensions, a short intro‑
duction will suffice for now. The military‑strategic one pertains to the threat or use 
of force to achieve policy objectives, in Clausewitz´s classic formulation. Here we 
will look at how Japan is deploying and employing its coercive means to protect 
its interests. Fortunately, the involvement of both countries´ military forces has 
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been limited and generally exercised apprehensively. That is not to say, however, 
that this dimension is altogether irrelevant or inconsequential. Following the (in)
famous Roman dictum, “Si vis pacem, para bellum”.
The penultimate dimension concerns the geopolitics and geostrategy of Japan´s 
involvement in the dispute. Because all political and military phenomena are geo‑
graphically situated within certain confines in space, it is important to locate this 
dispute within the larger context of East Asian security.
Lastly, the political dimension is where policy, strategy and military force con‑
verge in the form of statecraft, thus being directly responsible for the conduct of 
the higher affairs of state. This is the realm of grand strategy, and will only be 
briefly touched upon as we dare present a few topics for future study.
The Military-Strategic Dimension
In tackling the military‑strategic dimension of the dispute, we will pay special 
attention to two different factors which greatly influence Japan´s posture. Firstly, 
we will discuss threat perceptions and assessments. They constitute the represen‑
tations of insecurity to an international actor, normally a state. Secondly, we will 
refer to the role played by coercive means in active suasion and in the preservation 
of strategic flexibility.
Threat Perceptions and Assessment
Unlike the territorial dispute with Russia over the Kuriles/Northern Territories 
(Hoppou Ryoudo), which has had a relatively minor impact in Japanese military 
posture after the Cold War (Hiroshi, 2008), the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands has prompted major changes in Japan. It is true that a broader shift in Japa‑
nese perceptions, and subsequent assessment, of China as a concern to national se‑
curity was already well underway. This shift was due to factors partly exogenous 
to the dispute itself, as we will see next. Notwithstanding, it is unquestionable that 
the PRC´s recent behaviour in this dispute has accelerated ‑– if not crystallised – 
Japan´s perception into a threat of strategic importance.
The relationship with China has clearly been an issue of utmost importance in 
the post‑war era, and so it remained in the years following the collapse of the So‑
viet Union. But while hopes were fostered toward a period of open and construc‑
tive dialogue and cooperation, despite the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989, 
that momentum soon degenerated into frustration and then mistrust. Michael 
Green (2001: 78), from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, points 
out that first:
“Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro and Foreign Minister Hata Tsutomu began 
setting a new tone in the relationship in 1993 when they pressed Beijing pub‑
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licly for greater military transparency. [...] Then in 1996 the Taiwan Straits crisis, 
the reaffirmation of the U.S.‑Japan alliance, and an emotional dispute over the 
Senkaku (Diaoyutai) Islands sent Sino‑Japanese relations to a post‑war low.”
In the aftermath of the Cold War, therefore, there existed some uncertainty in de‑
vising a new strategy to provide guidance for the fin de siècle. The re‑emergence 
of China as a great power was obviously central to that uncertainty (Er, 2006). As 
early as 1992, the Japanese defence White Paper emphasised China´s increased 
naval activities, and to the surprise of many, made a direct reference to the threat 
presented against the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Defense Agency, 1992: 48). After 
these initial alarms started ringing, it soon became clear that the modernisation 
plans of the People´s Liberation Army (PLAN) went beyond the expected efforts 
to modernise existing capabilities and secure territorial defence. As Christopher 
Hughes (2009: 28) argued, “Japan´s concerns vis‑à‑vis China focus not just on its 
military build‑up but also on signs that it is now willing to project military power 
beyond its borders in support of its national interests.” It is the development of 
this power projection capability that most attracted Japanese attention, and the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were located at the frontline of China´s expanding area 
of operations. Japan´s 2005 defence White Paper reflected this concern: “It is nec‑
essary to keep paying attention to these modernization trends and to carefully 
evaluate whether the modernization of China´s military forces exceeds the level 
necessary for its national defense” (Defense Agency, 2005: 13).
But if uncertainty about Chinese regional power prevailed, Japan´s place in Asia 
and the world remained relatively unchanged, as did its strategic predicament. 
Kyoto University professor Masataka Kosaka’s (1965) classic book The Vision of 
Japan as a Maritime Nation constitutes a fundamental document synthesising the 
sources of Japanese national power. Masataka´s thesis epitomised a long‑standing 
tradition (Kitaoka, 2003: 225‑40), based on the understanding that peace, stability, 
freedom of navigation, free trade and an alliance with another major maritime 
power to contain a potential continental hegemon dictate the grand strategy of a 
country like Japan. The emergence of a continental hegemon willing to challenge 
this international order was hence a fundamental threat to Japan. Although di‑
fferent strategic visions emerged throughout the post‑war period, the immutable 
predicament dominated (Mochizuki, 1983/4: 152‑79).
The connections between this strategic predicament with the rise of China could 
not be more obvious, as they affect Japan is very tangible ways. Returning to 
Hughes, “Japan is aware that China could disrupt sea lanes with only a small 
blue‑water surface, submarine and amphibious naval capacity and through the 
assertion of its territorial claims in the East China Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
islets.” Much is truly at stake in discussion the nature of China´s rise vis‑à‑vis the 
Livro134.indd   85 13/05/15   14:20
Nação e Defesa 86
Tiago Alexandre Maurício
place of Japan in Asia. But however salient the perceptions of a Chinese threat 
over the horizon, in practice, this concern only became a threat at the turn of the 
century.
Following China´s 2004 defence White Paper, which expressed concerns over 
increasingly “complicated security factors in the Asia‑Pacific region”, Japan res‑
ponded in kind. “Around the same time” Bush (2010: 20) notes, “Japan was going 
public with its China concerns. The report of the semi‑official Council on Security 
and Defense Capabilities (the so‑called Araki Report) noted ‘security problems 
unique to [Japan’s] location in East Asia, including a China with nuclear weapons, 
the possibility of armed clashes in the Taiwan Strait, and failure to resolve peace‑
fully disputes over resource development’”.
Shortly afterwards, yet a bigger shift was operated on the Japanese side as its Na‑
tional Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG), a constitutive document in Japan´s 
strategic debates, made direct reference to China. It stated that “China, which has 
a major impact on regional security, continues to modernize its nuclear forces and 
missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces. China is also expanding its 
area of operation at sea. We will have to remain attentive to its future actions” 
(NDPG, 2004: 2). It also mentioned that “cross‑Taiwan Strait relations remain un‑
certain”, adding to the overall suspicion over China´s strategic intentions as a ri‑
sing continental power.
As suspicions accrued, Japanese official publications became more derogatory. 
2009 was a watershed moment in this regard, as “the Ministry of Defense identi‑
fied the invasion against the islands as one of five contingencies to which the Japa‑
nese Self‑Defense Forces (SDF) have to respond” (Ueki, 2011: 141). It had become 
obvious that bilateral security relations had not followed a path of conciliation 
and cooperation. Each country now considered the other a threat, if only within a 
limited security scope, as trade, foreign direct investment, and other non‑military 
dimensions continued witnessing accelerating interdependence. In short, Japan‑
China relations entered a phase of hot economics, cold politics (Li, 2013).
Suasion and Strategic Flexibility
As Japanese perceptions of Chinese power gave way to its assessment as a security 
threat, how has Japan sought to respond to it? The current deployment of coercive 
means envisages guaranteeing two things. First, that an adequate force presence 
based on a logic of suasion is in place against potential Chinese escalation. Second, 
that Japan preserves strategic flexibility to cope with escalation, should it inadvert‑
ently occur.
Suasion encompasses the deployment of military means to accomplish political 
goals. As in Luttwak’s (1974) definitive study on the naval dimension of armed 
suasion, the strategist suggests that suasion is a term “whose own meaning use‑
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fully suggests the indirectness of any political application of naval force” (Lut‑
twak, 1974: 3). In our case at hand, it shall be understood as the deployment of 
Japanese assets to the waters and skies surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
for the purpose of achieving a (favourable) political effect in China. For our pur‑
poses, scrambles by Air Self‑Defence Force (ASDF) aircraft will be understood in 
their tactical support to naval forces, as Chinese violations of airspace interdic‑
tions do not represent in and of themselves a threat to Japan´s sovereignty over 
the islands, but rather another step in the escalation ladder (Takasawa, 2013). So 
how is Japan´s defensive architecture organised to achieve suasion?
From a strategic standpoint, it makes sense to divide it into five tiers. They con‑
cern the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG), the Maritime Self‑Defence Force (MSDF), 
the Air Self‑Defence Force (ASDF), the U.S.‑Japan alliance, and intelligence‑gath‑
ering. But before we start, it should be noted that this typology bears no resem‑
blance to the various levels of strategy (Luttwak, 1987) (i.e. technical, tactical, 
operational, theatre and grand strategic), although such a study is also in order.
Concomitantly, we have Japan´s coast guard as the paramilitary force at the rough 
edge of this dispute. In effect, it has been 11th Regional Fleet coast guard vessels, 
based in Naha, Okinawa, which have most prominently engaged with China´s 
– and Taiwan´s – many incursions into what they claim as their own territorial 
waters. These include civilians setting sail from such places as Taipei, Shanghai 
and Hong Kong, to the Maritime Surveillance Force, the Chinese government´s 
most active maritime constabulary agency pushing forward Beijing´s territorial 
claims in the East China Sea. Statistics made available by the Sankei Shimbun 
of Japan, presented in table 1, illustrate the frantic rate of JCG‑MSF encounters 
since the decision by the Noda administration to nationalise the islands, in mid‑
September, until mid‑December.
The first two columns on the left indicate the month and day of occurrences, 
respectively. The third column refers to the daily encounters between the two 
constabulary forces, whereas the fourth and final column indicates the sparse 
encounters between the JCG and one of China´s other constabulary agencies, the 
Fisheries Law Enforcement Command. Through constant media reporting, we 
can safely infer the rate of encounters has remained relatively unchanged since 
these statistics were last collected, on December 16.
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Table 1 – Rate of encounters between JCG and MSF vessels in the territorial 
waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, from mid‑September 
until mid‑December 2012
Courtesy: Sankei
The rationale behind this first‑tier deployment is evident. As a constabulary force, 
the Japanese Coast Guard abides by different legislation and has different rules of 
engagement from the purely military Maritime Self‑Defence Force. This key dis‑
tinction has been abundantly referred to in Bush´s work The Perils of Proximity 
(2010), and may well be the primary reason why clashes have not spiralled out of 
control. Even amidst continuous direct exposure between opposing fleets and the 
seldom use of water cannons and ramming tactics against Taiwanese and Chinese 
vessels, which were duly reciprocated, the political leadership on both sides was 
able to disengage and de‑escalate the crisis to more amenable levels of animosity. 
This intensive pressure notwithstanding, the coast guard does not stand alone.
In the second tier of this architecture we find the navy proper. More secretive in 
its deployments and operations, the MSDF has undoubtedly contributed to de‑
ter Chinese intentions from beefing its claim with more advanced and aggressive 
hardware (Defense of Japan, 2012: III). The fact that the PLAN has been kept at 
bay reveals not only a strategic option on Beijing´s behalf – one also adopted in its 
disputes in the South China Sea, incidentally –, but also a firm evidence of Japan´s 
active naval suasion, of a coercive and negative type, that is, deterrent in its aims 
(Luttwak, 1974: 7‑9, 17‑38).
Besides naval suasion, there is another mechanism at play here. Given the legiti‑
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mate concerns about the consequences of putting Japanese naval warships with 
military personnel in the islands´ surroundings, there is a keen sensibility to‑
ward the preservation of strategic flexibility. In other words, a clear separation of 
responsibilities is observed, as the MSDF steers away from direct coastal protec‑
tion against, and detention and boarding of, Chinese civilian and constabulary 
vessels and crew. This separation of jurisdictions has thus ensured the Japanese 
government enough political leeway to handle each occurrence appropriately 
without raising disproportionate political fallout from denouncements by the 
Chinese go‑vernment and media over treatment of its nationals. Indeed, should 
the MSDF be perceived as being directly involved, domestic public outcries in 
China, fuelled by ever‑present historical memories of Japan´s imperial and mili‑
taristic past, could greatly reduce the Communist Party´s decision‑making free‑
dom and potentially portray the event as an act of war. As a result, the task afore‑
mentioned is left to the JCG, which has even resorted to Okinawa Prefecture law 
enforcement agents to handle the detention of crew members, for their allegedly 
softer methods. This is not an unimportant matter when many of these crews 
often include media repor‑ters amongst them to ensure greater public visibility 
in China (and Taiwan).
The third tier corresponds to the activities of the Air Self‑Defence Force. This arm 
of the military has recently been brought to the limelight in light of recent inter‑
ceptions of Chinese aircraft over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands´ air defence iden‑
tification zone. As Bush correctly points out, Japan is one of few countries where 
this zone coincides with the EEZ, thereby vastly expanding the area of jurisdic‑
tion (Bush, 2010: 68). Consequently, a relatively high number of ASDF scrambles 
should not raise many eyebrows. What the following graph illustrates nonethe‑
less, is a substantial increase in the scrambling of ASDF aircraft directed toward 
Chinese intrusions in recent years.
Illustration 1 – Number of ASDF scrambles for protection of airspace since 2006 
Source: Asahi Shimbun
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The attentive reader will not fail to notice the existing mismatch between Ru‑ssian 
and Chinese incursions in the airspace surrounding the Japanese islands. In this 
regard, judging by the numbers alone, one would be inclined to regard Russia as 
a much bigger threat than China. What is unfolding instead is a combination of 
a Russian air force fleet being much larger than China´s, and “the testing Japan’s 
capabilities to defend its claims to the island chain [Kuriles/Northern Territories]” 
(Mastro and Stokes, 2011: 15). Russo‑Japanese relations aside, what is noteworthy 
is the rapid increase of Chinese incursions at the same time that political tensions 
rise in bilateral relations. This nexus cannot be overstated. It is precisely this cor‑
relation between material developments and subjective assessments that has put 
Japanese authorities on the alert.
Below is another illustration of Chinese activities over Japanese airspace, particu‑
larly over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (orange lines at the lower left corner of 
the map). The table on the left displays a greater data range, showing in quantita‑
tive terms the not insignificant increase of the People´s Liberation Army Air Force 
(PLAAF) incursions resulting the scrambling of ASDF aircraft to intercept, from 
2002 (Heisei 14) until 2011 (Heisei 23). It is relevant to add that the number of 
ASDF scrambles against Chinese aircraft between October (following nationalisa‑
tion) and December 2012 alone was 91, more than half of what had been registered 
between January and October (Yomiuri,2013). The issue has become so pressing 
that talks have been started within the Ministry of Defence to transfer an ASDF air 
wing to the Sakishima Islands, south of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. This deci‑
sion, experts believe, would halve the time between lift off and engagement, as 
previously Chinese aircraft could evade interception before Japanese fighter jets 
reached the scene (Yomiuri, 2013).
The fourth tier is represented by the U.S.‑Japan alliance and it functions as a deci‑
sive element in Japan´s deterrent strategy, provided Washington demonstrates the 
political will to protect its ally in its claim over the Senkaku/Diaoyu ‑ a topic which 
still ignites fierce discussions (Ueki, 2011). If this mechanism works, then stability 
is ensured as the probabilities of China becoming militarily involved in a conflict 
against Japan and the United States in a context of nuclear and conventional infe‑
riority are drastically reduced.
Lastly, the fifth tier addresses intelligence‑gathering activities. They cover all 
sectors, from HUMINT (Bush, 2010: VII) to SIGINT (Takasawa, 2013; Mainichi, 
2013) and have suffered a major overhaul in recent years. These activities assist 
policymakers make better judgements when assessing and acting upon unfold‑
ing events. No detailed accounts of their activities and success exists open to the 
public eye.
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Illustration 2 – Activities in the air space surrounding the Japanese islands, 
in numerical and graphic representation
Source: Defense of Japan (2012: 177)
To sum up, this defensive architecture provides for an intricate system of partially 
overlapping tiers, working to guarantee Japanese retention of initiative in suasion 
to prevent unnecessary escalation, and a great degree of strategic flexibility in con‑
trolling escalation should it occur.
The Geopolitics and Geostrategy of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute
In scholarly accounts of the dispute under consideration, there is an evident dis‑
regard for the overlapping layers of geographic significance. These layers reflect 
an overall assessment by Japanese and Chinese authorities regarding the geo‑
strategic interplay at hand, pertaining to matters beyond the limited geographical 
confines of the islands themselves. As we will argue, these layers are vital to the 
understanding of both countries´ views toward the dispute, for they connect to 
elements of overall greater strategic importance.
This frequent disregard for geography is not particular to analyses on this dis‑
pute. Gray (2010: 78) posits that: “Geography, geopolitics, and geostrategy have 
long been out of favour by Western scholars of international relations and strate‑
gic studies”, which perhaps explains this analytical short sightedness. Fortunately, 
that is not so much the case for Japanese analysts.
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Gray (1991) clarifies the importance of this dimension. The strategist (2010: 78) 
claims that “strategy must always have geographical, and hence geopolitical and 
geostrategic, referents. Strategy is designed from the standpoint of particular 
geopolitical and geostrategic interests. As a general rule, it is composed on be‑
half of geopolitical units whose societies are encultured as products of histories 
that have been shaped critically by geography.” Those geography‑based interests 
and histories are essential to a true appreciation of the stakes involved in this 
confrontation.
Not surprisingly, for Japan this is more than a dispute over a group of islands in 
the vicinity of Okinawa and Taiwan. In this regard, we have identified five geo‑
graphic referents at play here.
China´s First Island Chain
China´s so‑called Island Chain strategy, or Offshore Active Defence, refers to an 
unclear number of formulations of China´s territorial integrity and maritime in‑
terests as postulated in a theoretical framework for national security. Opinions di‑
verge over its rightful doctrinal author, with analysts arguably converging around 
former PLAN. Admiral Liu Huaqing, Mao Zedong, Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao 
(Bennett, 2010: 128‑129). Historically, China´s naval arm was of limited strategic 
importance, although this modernisation promises to revert decades of maritime 
malpractice and lay the groundworks for a strong navy (Ministry of National De‑
fence, 2008: V).
The aforementioned strategy is divided into three operational areas, and two 
island chains, spreading from the Chinese coast outwards. The first encompa‑ 
sses the Yellow, East and South China Seas, limited only by the Korean Peninsula, 
Japan´s westernmost islands including the Ryukyu, and as far south as today´s 
contested waters north of Malaysia. The second island chain extends farther into 
the Western Pacific, reaching from the main island of Honshu, Japan, to the U.S. 
territory of Guam, and New Guinea. The third operational area corresponds to the 
remaining global maritime commons, although some analysts argue it may consist 
of another island chain extending to Hawaii, in the Central Pacific, or instead to the 
Indian ocean (Holmes, 2011; Jha, 2010).
These formulations, notwithstanding some critics, including former commander 
of the MSDF, V.Adm (ret.) Koda Yoji (2010), question the existence, never mind the 
utility, of this strategic conception. As it stands, these chains attest to a concentric 
delineation of defensive perimeters which Beijing might perceive as contested or 
hostile in operational planning. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are clearly located 
within the first island chain, which has Taiwan at its heart. Gaining access to these 
islands, therefore, acquires a new geostrategic meaning amidst expanding Chinese 
military capabilities. As Watanabe (2011) suggests, the “largest of the Senkaku Is‑
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lands, Uotsurijima, would be extremely valuable as a base for ballistic, anti‑ship, 
and anti‑aircraft missiles.”
Other analysts have also indicated the potential value of the islands to Beijing´s 
submarine flotillas. As all of China´s neighbouring waters appear vulnerable to 
the United States´ forward‑presence power‑projection capabilities, a naval strat‑
egy based upon carrier battle groups as centrepieces of American sea power, it 
stands as a logical objective for the People´s Liberation Army Navy to seek to es‑
tablish an area free of foreign interference. Following this rationale, Kawamura, 
former commander of the MSDF´s antisubmarine air wing, boldly claims that: 
“No option is left (for China) except for trying to make the South China Sea a 
safe haven and defending submarines carrying nuclear missiles there” (Yosh‑
ida, 2012). There are several aspects requiring further analysis, such as terrain 
conditions and underwater cartography, but theoretically the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
could become a privileged base, less than 200km away from Taiwan, to operate 
Chinese submarines. Bush (2010: 19) also mentions the threat from submarines, 
as they now make regular visits around Japan´s Exclusive Economic Zones in its 
westernmost islands.
A Military Confrontation over Taiwan
Closely interrelated with the previous geographic referent is a military confronta‑
tion over Taiwan between Chinese forces on one side, and Taiwanese, American 
and potentially Japanese forces on the other. The aforementioned Araki Report 
first established the linkage between the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and the 
“Taiwan issue”, indicating a Japanese commitment to aid an American interven‑
tion in Taiwan. According to Bush (2010: 20), the Araki Report focused on “security 
problems unique to (Japan’s) location in East Asia, including a China with nuclear 
weapons, the possibility of armed clashes in the Taiwan Strait, and failure to re‑
solve peacefully disputes over resource development [allusion to the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands dispute].”
Cross‑strait relations are thus extremely important to regional security from a 
Japanese standpoint, especially in light of Chinese territorial ambitions in the 
East China Sea. Furthermore, should any military contingency arise over Taiwan 
requiring the participation of the United States, the bulk of human and mate‑
rial resources would be sent from bases in Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan, 
as mentioned in the fourth geographic referent. The geographical proximity of 
Okinawa to Taiwan would surely rank high amongst Beijing´s threat assess‑
ments. Depending on the nature of the contingency, therefore, Chinese armed 
forces could militarily contest possession of the disputed islands. This would be 
in line with its historical interpretations of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands being 
part of Taiwan, and with a geostrategic imperative to serve as an important foot‑
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hold to stage military operations to secure unimpeded access to Taiwan against 
Okinawa‑based forces (Berteau et al, 2012: 13‑15, 40).
Strategic Breakout to the Pacific: the Ishigaki and Miyako Straits
The third geographic referent in this dispute pertains to China´s access to the vast 
expanses of the Pacific Ocean. As existing frontiers presently dictate, the PLAN, 
much like the Soviet navy of old, is mostly locked from an open, unguarded 
access where to operate its growing blue‑water navy capabilities. Miyako Strait, 
adjacent to the Japanese island of the same name, is an international passage 
where an entry into the Pacific can be made, but it stands close to American and 
Japanese intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) stations in neighbou‑
ring islands. The same applies to Ishigaki Island and all of Japan´s southwestern 
approaches. As illustration 3 demonstrates, this geography dictates a reality 
whereby American and Japanese naval assets can curtail China´s expanding ca‑
pabilities and restrict them to the confines of its surrounding waters.
Alternatively, China could opt to navigate northeastwardly and follow through 
the Tsugaru Strait, an international passage in the Northern Territories/Kuriles, 
as it once did in 2008 (much to Japan´s surprise). This option, however, consti‑
tutes a much longer route and could arguably entail as many chances of being 
detected as sailing directly eastward through the Miyako Strait.
If PLAN warships are not to be confined to the relatively shallow waters of 
the Yellow and East China Seas until the Okinawa Through, acquiring easier 
access to the Pacific Ocean is a strategic priority. These ambitions notwithstan‑
ding, there have been criticisms of its ships not being at sea as frequently as 
required by a strong navy it aims to be, raising questions about the PLA Navy´s 
ability to initiate and sustain deployments efficiently and away from its shores 
for long periods of time (Holmes, 2013). Certainly the geographical disposition 
of Japanese defence systems for its farthest islands and the U.S. Navy´s forward 
presence add to the bottleneck effect played by Japanese islands in restricting 
PLAN´s operations (Berteau et al, 2012: 13‑16). Conversely, should China gain 
access to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, exploring their geographic 
proximity to the Miyako/Ishigaki Straits for its submarine flotillas could make 
geostrategic sense for advanced deployments in the Western Pacific (or second 
island chain).
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Illustration 3 – Advancements to the Pacific Ocean by Chinese naval vessels
Source: Defense of Japan (2012: 38)
U.S. Forward Presence and Bases in Japan
The fourth referent concerns US military bases in Okinawa, where the majority 
of United States Forces Japan (USFJ) personnel and the III Marine Expeditionary 
Unit, with 18.000 troops, are quartered. Despite the recent troops drawdown in 
Okinawa and the initiation of revision talks for America´s force posture in Pacific 
Command (Berteau et al, 2012), Japan, according to a Pentagon‑commissioned re‑
port by C.S.I.S., “is the lynchpin for U.S. access and influence in the Asia Pacific 
region” (Ibid.: 23‑26). Its importance can only be accentuated by the so‑called “Asia 
Pivot”, whereby Washington made promises to commit more resources and atten‑
tion to this increasingly important region of the globe (Clinton, 2011).
Thus far, the only public references to a Chinese threat to US forces in Okinawa 
were made in the context of a Taiwan contingency (Bush, 2005; 2010). To Japan, 
this has only favoured its intentions to further integrate America´s defence strat‑
egy through the advancement of the U.S.‑Japan alliance (Nye and Armitage, 
2012). Nonetheless, a new variable has recently been brought to bear by a senior 
PLA officer. Speaking to the Global Times newspaper, a mouthpiece of the Chinese 
Communist Party, Major General Jin Yinan openly questioned Japan´s sovereign‑
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ty over the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa (Hille, 2012). Comprehensively, 
Takahashi (2010), an analyst at Jane´s Defence Weekly, argued that “[m]ore than a 
few Chinese scholars are beginning to claim Okinawa as Chinese land by writing 
numerous academic papers in Chinese journals, though they are still in a minor‑
ity among historians.”
While the strategic implications of such claims in terms of a Chinese attack 
against Okinawa may remain in the realm of conjecture and war planning, the 
political fallout of such revisionist statements can only contribute to deteriorate 
the already fragile state of Sino‑Japanese relations and galvanise US opinion in 
Japan´s favour.
Although not publicly disclosed, it is safe to speculate about the existence of 
war plans in both Japan and the United States, including studies on joint 
operations, on the military implications to SDF and USFJ troops in Okinawa, in 
the event of a Chinese hostile takeover of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Matake, 
2009). In fact, Ueki (2011: 141) pointedly drew the line between these two meta‑
phorical dots. “The additional forces provided by the United States through the 
alliance”, the former China specialist and contributor to Japan´s defence White 
Paper argues, “would obviously make a Chinese attack on the Senkaku islands 
more difficult. The United States has fighter jets in Okinawa and one carrier ba‑
ttle group home ported in Japan.” Ueki then concludes by stating that “[t]he po‑
ssibility of escalation that involves the United States forces a more complicated 
war plan on China. The fear of an inadvertent escalation, including the possible 
use of nuclear weapons, deters even a limited use of force.” Should that happen, 
Okinawa would stand on the frontline of military contingencies and represent 
the geographic “aircraft carrier” from which to launch operations.
Japan´s Lifeline: Sea Lines of Communication
Lastly, for a maritime nation such as Japan, any disruption to its vital sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs) would entail an existential threat to its very prosperity 
and subsistence (Yamaguchi, 2012: 81‑103; Patalano, 2012: 219‑237; Graham, 2005).
Grand-Strategic Options
It is at the highest level of grand strategy that all these dimensions intersect. The 
historical, economic, social and cultural, technological, military‑strategic, geopo‑
litical and geostrategic, and political dimensions hence redouble the challenges 
to the formulation of a coherent policy. Concordantly, the question over which 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute policy should Japan follow simply begs another, 
much larger, question: which China‑policy ought Japan pursue? This is one of the 
quintessential questions of modern Japanese foreign policy and admittedly the 
opinions vary greatly (Togo, Rozman and Ferguson, 2007; Samuels, 2007).
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It is uncertain which current in Japanese policy and intellectual circles will prevail 
and most decisively shape foreign and security policy, for one must discount the 
power of leadership in carving out new policies. In this sense, following Abe´s re‑
cent return to power, many analysts are already expecting the new Prime‑Minister 
to bring a distinctive personal trait into Japanese foreign policy (Yokota and Mill‑
er, 2013). His long record of public statements, speeches and publications, most 
notably his book (2006) entitled Utsukushii Kuni-e (Toward a Beautiful Country) 
foreshadow an intellectual blueprint of some of the influence Abe is expected to 
exercise in policy‑making. This is particularly relevant in the context of a Cabinet 
Office with increasing powers in Japanese politics, and hence not as restrained 
by institutional and other mechanisms as other administrations in the past (Bush, 
2010: VI‑VII; Estévez‑Abe, 2006).
So what influence is Abe expected to have? As the grandson of former Prime‑
Minister Kishi Nobusuke, and son of former Foreign Minister Abe Shintaro, his 
is a vision profoundly imbued by conservatism. According to Levidis (2012): 
“the key to this return was Abe’s ability to articulate a vision of conservative 
and statist rejuvenation of Japan, defence of the social order and a willingness 
not to shrink from advocating a hardline approach to China and the preservation 
of Japanese sovereignty.” Consequently, his view is nothing short of a sweeping 
transformation of Japanese society as it currently stands. Nonetheless, doubts 
persist regarding the impact of the failures during the first administration will 
have. Continuing with Levidis, Abe “failed to bring about revision of the post 
war constitution; he failed to alter the role of the Emperor and imperial fa‑ 
mily; he failed to comprehensively reform the institutions of national security; he 
failed to enhance Japanese leadership in Asia; he failed to continue the structural 
economic reforms of the Koizumi cabinet; and he failed to insist on reform of the 
Liberal Democratic Party”. Can he thus gear the necessary changes to substan‑
tially affect Japan´s China policy?
Abe has returned to office with a new impetus, apparently wanting to offset the 
rather negative public perception which brought down his administration in 2007. 
The first major development has been an announcement of a vision toward an 
Asian security diamond. In an op‑ed published in late December 2012, he voiced 
his concerns over Chinese intentions to transform the East and South China Sea 
into “Lake Beijing”, denoting a keen awareness of the strategic challenges imposed 
by China´s rise (Abe, 2012; Nabeshima, 2012). Against this and other destabilising 
forces in the region, including North Korea, threats to the global commons, among 
others, Abe proposed the creation of a quadrilateral security framework bring‑
ing together Japan, the United States, India and Australia (Kaneda, 2013; Medcalf, 
2013; Hirabayashi, 2011). Should this initiative come to fruition, it would signal 
a robust step in the creation of an Asian security architecture, the promotion of 
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global governance and the balancing against a rising hegemonic power in the con‑
tinent, i.e. China (Medcalf, 2013).
Alongside these transformations in Japan´s strategic debates and leadership, oth‑
er factors are likely to influence the outcome of this Sino‑Japanese dispute. They 
could be tersely presented following Thucydides´ classic trinity of fear, interest and 
honour for their interplay pervades whatever course of action Japan will eventually 
follow in its dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Here are but a few of the 
factors where that interplay introduces a substantive amount of uncertainty into 
strategic assessments.
First, Japan´s immovable commitment to maintain territorial sovereignty is a key 
factor that can override all other rational‑based policies. These are volatile times 
in East Asian politics and the confluence of elite perceptions with popular opinion 
might direct actors to interact in often unexpected ways. The operational level of 
strategy is, in this regard, of utmost importance as Bush (2010) correctly conclud‑
ed. Given the potential for miscalculation and miscommunication, actors at the 
sharp edge of the dispute (i.e. out in the sea) may provoke an unforeseen escalation 
that neither government will be able to contain.
Second, Japan´s commitment to strengthen the US‑Japan alliance remains a found‑
ing pillar of its foreign and security policy. Therefore Tokyo must remain acutely 
attentive to Washington´s moves in its policy toward the middle kingdom, as the 
relationship between the United States and China will inexorably have an impor‑
tant impact in Tokyo´s China‑policy.
Third, Japan is equally committed to pursue economic recovery after the “two lost 
decades”, and the devastation resulting from the earthquake and tsunami di‑sasters 
of March 2011. China plays a major role in this strategy, as the upward trend in 
bilateral trade has demonstrated, despite souring political relations. This said, the 
moderating effect of economic interdependence in the dispute remains unknown.
Fourth, we must also acknowledge ongoing steps to remove, or at least relax, 
Japan´s anti‑militarist constraints. These steps toward militarisation have greatly 
benefited from China´s own military modernisation and uncertain strategic inter‑
ests (Hughes, 2009) though they are not exhausted by that single threat. U.S. pre‑
ssure to take on a great role in international security, North Korea´s nuclear and 
ballistic programs, the fight against terrorism and organised crime, among others, 
are forces accruing to erode many of the constitutional, legal and political limita‑
tions to the full integration of military power in foreign policy formulation. The 
speed and scope of this erosion will have a direct bearing on the management of 
the dispute.
Fifth, we must consider Japan´s ambitions to extend its diplomatic outreach to 
countries in Southeast Asia, and recently through the strengthening of security 
ties. Accordingly, China´s territorial disputes in the South China Sea will positive‑
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ly affect regional perceptions of Chinese interests and position in the balance of 
power, perhaps to Japan´s advantage. Growing fears of Chinese assertiveness and 
revisionism may be drawing countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia and the Phili‑
ppines closer to Japan, in a typical mechanism of external balancing.
Ultimately, and despite the focus of this paper, the best answer may not be military 
in nature. Keeping diplomatic channels open is fundamental. Negotiating informal 
agreements, away from the public eye, is also recommendable, and some steps have 
been taken in this direction. As Wallace (2012) highlights, “during the CCP’s crucial 
Beidaihe summer retreat, a consensus decision was made to use non‑military tools 
to ‘resolve’ the territorial issue.” These are reassuring signs, and should be further 
promoted. In this sense, the creation of the communication mechanism between the 
defence authorities, agreed upon by Wen Jiabao during his trip to Japan in 2007, 
should be pursued immediately and made extensive use of, to complement other 
channels for communication between senior officials on both sides (JFIR, 2012).
It may simply be that this dispute cannot be resolved. Instead, management within 
acceptable risks may be the best it can be reasonably achieved.
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